Mercer Law Review
Volume 48
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 9

7-1997

Environmental Law
W. Scott Laseter
Julie V. Mayfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laseter, W. Scott and Mayfield, Julie V. (1997) "Environmental Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 48 : No. 4 ,
Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol48/iss4/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Environmental Law
W. Scott Laseter"
and
Julie V. Mayfield"
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This Article marks the fourth survey of environmental law in the
Eleventh Circuit.1 In terms of environmental issues, the most recent
period was an active one for the Eleventh Circuit and its associated
district courts2 during which the appellate court handed down its first
Endangered Species Act decisions; issued a sweeping decision under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act; and heard several other cases raising important environmental questions. Additionally, the survey period saw a federal district
judge from Alabama strike a blow against Superfund's5 vaunted armor

* Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the
South (B.A., 1984); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cure laude, 1990).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1988-1990).
** Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson College
(B-A., cum laude, Religion, 1989); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with distinction,
1996). Emory International Law Review, Executive Articles Editor (1995-1996).
1. See W. Scott Laseter, EnvironmentalLaw, MERCER L. REV. 1359 (1995); Edward A.
Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1187 (1993);
Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1411
(1991).
2. The Eleventh Circuit hears appeals from district courts in Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
3. See infra discussion beginning at n. 204.
4. See infra discussion beginning at n. 112.
5. Superfund is a common name for the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, in reference to the trust fund
used to finance some of the United States Environmental Protection Agency's activities
under the statute.
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by declaring that the statute should not be given retroactive effect.8
While the long-term viability of that particular decision remains to be
seen, it has at least sparked a spirited debate among environmental
practitioners both in the Eleventh Circuit and across the country.
In keeping with previous surveys, this Article begins by discussing
cases addressing the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA7);7
followed by the Clean Water Act ("CWA7);' the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA7);' and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").' 0 As suggested
earlier, this survey also includes a discussion of the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").
With the exception of the section on the ESA, this
Article omits a review of the basic statutory scheme of the acts12 in
question as these reviews can be found in previous survey articles.

II. DIscussIoN OF CASES
A.

National EnvironmentalPolicy Act
The Eleventh Circuit considered two cases during the survey period
that raised the issue of what constitutes a "significant impact" on the
environment sufficient to trigger an obligation to perform an environmental impact statement ("EIS") under NEPA. In both cases, plaintiffs
disagreed with the agency's determination that its proposed action would
not have a significant impact, and in both cases the court upheld the
agency's decision. These cases join with decisions from this and other
circuits indicating that, to challenge an agency's action under NEPA,
plaintiffs must do more than earnestly disagree with the agency's
decision. Rather, to prevail, NEPA plaintiffs must almost always show
that the agency either failed to take into consideration relevant
information" or made some fundamental analytical error.14

6. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1519-20 (S.D. Ala. 1996),
discussed infra at note 113.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
8. 33 U.S.CAL §§ 1251-1387 (West Supp. 1996).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1994).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
12. See supra note 1.
13. See Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996) (EIS
prepared by Forest Service did not sufficiently explore all reasonable alternatives); City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp., 95 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1996) (EIS by
Federal Highway Administrator did not consider the reasonable range of alternatives, its
cumulative impact analysis was insufficiently detailed, and its reliance on old data
rendered the EIS inadequate); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d 1485
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In Preserve EndangeredAreas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. United States
Army Corps ofEngineers,5 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in issuing a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI")
following an environmental assessment ("EA7) in connection with a CWA
section 40416 permit application. While at first glance the decision
appears to consider whether the issuance of the section 404 permit was
a "major federal action," the case is best understood as raising the
question of what constitutes a "significant impact. " 17 Accordingly, a
brief detour to review the Corps' regulations implementing NEPA may
be helpful before discussing the case itself.
Normally, the threshold question in NEPA cases is whether the
proposed agency activity is a "major federal action."1 8 In the'absence
of a major federal action, NEPA simply does not apply."' If, on the
other hand, the activity is a "major federal action," the next question is
whether the action will have a "significant impact" on the environment.2" The Corps' regulations, however, alter this analytical sequence
in that the Corps concedes that the issuance of a section 404 permit is
a major federal action.2 ' Accordingly, under the Corps' regulations, the

(9th Cir. 1995) (EIS by Corps was inadequate because it was too limited in its scope of
analysis of the cumulative impact of a dam); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1286 (1st Cir.
1973) (EIS by Department of Housing & Urban Development was inadequate in that it
failed to recognize the scope of the problem, did not describe alternatives, and did not
address the project's effects on nearby areas); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972) (EIS by Corps was vague, general, and conclusory,
and its discussion of alternatives was unsatisfactory).
14. Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437,447-48 (4th Cir.
1996) (Corps' EIS violated NEPA in that the Corps used an inflated estimate of the
project's economic benefit); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) (EIS by
Department of Housing & Urban Development was inadequate in that it lacked a sufficient
discussion of the alternatives as well as a reasoned basis for the choices made); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 287 (E.D.N.C. 1973) (EIS by
Department of Agriculture was conclusory and either misrepresented or failed to disclose
the data on which it was based).
15. 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
17. See 87 F.3d at 1248.
18. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (1996).
19. See id. See also Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42
MERCER L. REv. 1411, 1417-21 (1991).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1996).
21. See 33 C.F.R. § 230.7(a) (1996). See also Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend
Hydroelec. Co., 988 F.2d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 1993); Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps
of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 866 F.2d 1025, 1032 (8th Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 744 F. Supp. 352, 365 n.19 (D. Me. 1989).
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threshold question in section 404 permit cases is whether the proposed
action will have a significant impact on the environment. This question
is answered through the preparation of an EA.' Although the court in
Preserve EndangeredAreas makes reference to the question of whether
the permit approval was a major federal action, the real thrust of the
opinion deals with the question of significant impact.
Plaintiffs in PreserveEndangeredAreas sued to stop a proposed road
which would have cut through approximately four acres of wetland as
well as one acre of a Cobb County, Georgia, historic district.' As part
of the CWA section 404 permit application, Cobb County developed a
mitigation plan that set aside almost twenty acres of wetlands for
preservation and restored another eight acres of wetlands.24 The plan
also contained measures to mitigate the effect the highway would have
on the historic district by providing for special signs and limited access
in those areas.2" Taking into account the mitigation plan, the Corps
issued a FONSI and granted the section 404 permit application,
determining the project would not significantly affect the environment."
Claiming that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing
the permit, plaintiffs first argued that the Corps should not have
segmented the project so that it was viewed in isolation instead of as
part of a larger highway system. 27 The court, as had the Corps,
examined the project under the Federal Highway Administration
2
guidelines that govern whether a project is a stand-alone project.
Placing the burden on the plaintiffs, the court held that they failed to
show that the Corps had not considered these factors or that it was
fundamentally mistaken in its analysis.' Therefore, the court held, the
Corps "did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it analyzed the
highway as a stand-alone project."3'

22. 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1996).
23. See 87 F.3d at 1245.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27.

I& at 1247.

28. See id. Numerous decisions have used these factors in examining highway
segments for purposes of NEPA analysis. See Save Barton Creek Ass'n v. Federal Highway
Admin., 950 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1992); Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart,
906 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1990); Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981);
Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1975); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
29. 87 F.3d at 1247-48.
30.

Id at 1248.
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The court next considered plaintiffs' position that the highway would
have a significant impact on both the wetlands and the historic
district.8 1 On both points, however, the court found that the Corps did
not err in its decision.32 The court explained:
[alithough the plaintiffs disagree with the conclusion of the Corps, they
can point to nothing that would make the Corps [sic] decision arbitrary
and capricious. The Corps considered the impact on the wetlands,
considered the county's mitigation plan, and reasonably concluded that
the impact on the wetlands would not be significant.'
As for the historic district, the court likewise stated that, "[tihe plaintiffs
may disagree with [the Corps' conclusion], but the Corps considered their
arguments, considered the effects on the district, and considered the
county's mitigation plan. The conclusion was based on those considerations.' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps on the NEPA
issues.85
In Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice,8" the Eleventh Circuit further
emphasized the need for plaintiffs to produce either new information or
show material analytical errors in order to prevail under NEPA. Fund
for Animals involved a Florida county's effort to build a landfill on a
6150 acre site called the Walton Tract. 7 The site contained significant
acreage of wetlands, giving rise to the county's application for a CWA
section 404 permit.88 As part of its review process, the Corps performed an EA and issued a FONSI.8 Consequently, the Corps issued
the section 404 permit without preparing an EIS.4°
Among a number of other claims, 4" plaintiffs objected to the Corps'
FONSI under NEPA. Following the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Corps, plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the
Corps ignored the proposed project's harmful effects on the environment

31. Id
32. Id.
33. I4
34. Id. at 1248-49.
35. Id. at 1250.
36. 85 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1996).
37. Id. at 539.
38. Id.
39. Id See supra notes 21-22 for discussion of the Corps' regulations triggering the
need for NEPA analysis.
40. 85 F.3d at 539.
41. Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the CWA and ESA, see 85 F.3d at 540, which
are discussed in the respective sections of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes
83-92 and 216-19.
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and, therefore, violated NEPA by not preparing an EIS.42 Setting forth
the familiar standard of review, the court explained that its "only role
(under NEPAl is to ensure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the
environmental consequences of the proposed action." Thus, "once an
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements,
the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive.""
Examining the facts, the court noted that when the Corps issued the
FONSI, it had in its possession two "no jeopardy" biological opinions
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") regarding the endangered and threatened species in the area, volumes of information
gathered at two public hearings, the benefit of five years of administrative review of the project, and the approval of the permit by the EPA.'
Based on this information, the court found that the Corps had considered
all the environmental consequences of the landfill raised by plaintiffs,
and therefore, the Corps' decision was not arbitrary or capricious.'
As suggested earlier, Fund for Animals and Preserve Endangered
Areas join a long line of cases in which courts have refused to secondguess an agency's judgment regarding the importance or significance of
impacts when the agency has considered all the pertinent information.47 The lesson of these cases is that success under NEPA is more
likely if a plaintiff can call to the court's attention either factors not
considered by the agency in assessing the significance of the impacts or
an error in its analysis, rather than merely pressing a disagreement
with the agency's conclusion, no matter how heart-felt (or even justified)
the plaintiff's difference of opinion may be.
B. Clean Water Act
The following CWA cases are divided into two sections. The first
section examines those cases that are brought under the citizen suit
provision of the CWA. The second section considers a case brought by
the government for a violation of section 404.

42. 85 F.3d at 546.
43. Id. (quoting Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 709
(11th Cir. 1985)).
44. Id. at 546-47 (quoting Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227 (1979)).
45. Id. at 546.
46. Id. at 546-47.
47. See supra cases cited at notes 13 and 14.
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1. Citizen Suits. In Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.," the court
considered whether a defendant home builder had violated section 301
of the CWA by discharging stormwater without a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit when no permit for
such construction activities was available.' JMS commenced construction on a residential subdivision, having obtained all the required state
and local permits that were available at that time. Under section 402
of the CWA, the EPA has delegated administration of the NPDES
program in Georgia to the state's Environmental Protection Division
("EPD"). 50 Although under the CWA regulations construction activities
disturbing greater than five acres are prohibited without a permit,5 1 at
the time JMS commenced construction, the EPD was not issuing
stormwater permits, explaining that it was waiting for the EPA's
development of federal guidelines.5"
During and after construction of the subdivision, silt-laden rainwater
ran off the property into the Yellow River, and plaintiff sued JMS
alleging it violated the CWA by discharging pollutants without a
permit." Plaintiff argued that, in the absence of a lawfully issued
permit setting discharge conditions and limits, defendants were not
allowed to discharge any pollutants into the waters of the United
States." JMS defended on the basis that it should not be punished for
"failing to secure a NPDES permit when no such permit was available."5 The district court rejected this defense and granted plaintiff
both a permanent injunction and his attorney fees."

48. 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 482 (1996).
49. The "National Pollution Discharge Elimination System" ("NPDES") program
regulates "point source" discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (West Supp. 1996). These permits principally target industrial and
municipal waste water. Under the regulatory scheme, dischargers normally must obtain
a permit from the EPA. States, however, may develop their own permitting program. If
the EPA approves a state's program, the state then becomes the implementing agency for
NPDES permits although the federal agency retains authority to veto state issued permits.
All three Eleventh Circuit states have delegated NPDES programs; however, Florida is not
yet fully authorized to issue stormwater permits. Id. § 1342. Section 1342(p) of the CWA
extends the NPDES program to stormwater discharges.
50. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (West Supp. 1996).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 122'26(b)(14Xx) (1996).
52. 78 F.3d at 1526.
53. Id. at 1527.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1528.
56. Id. at 1524.
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Observing that its jurisprudence has "eschewed the rigid application
of a law where doing so produces impossible, absurd, or unjust results,"
the Eleventh Circuit reversed.57 , The appellate court focused not only
on the impossibility of obtaining a permit, but also on the factual
impossibility of complying with the zero discharge standard contained
in section 301 for stormwater, because "[tihe evidence was uncontroverted that whenever it rained in Gwinnett County some discharge was
going to occur; nothing JMS could do would prevent all rain water
discharge."" The court pithily added, "[practically speaking, rain
water will run downhill, and not even a law passed by the Congress of
the United States can stop that."5 9 Due to the fact that there was no
NPDES permit available to JMS, that JMS had complied with all state
and county discharge limits on stormwater, that the discharges were
minimal, and that zero discharge was factually impossible, the court
found that JMS was not in violation of the CWA.° In so doing, the
court refused to place on JMS the burden produced by the EPD's
inability to issue a stormwater permit.61
Preserve Endangered Areas, discussed previously in the section on
NEPA, also involved a CWA citizen suit claim. 2 In that case, plaintiffs
tried to block construction of a highway segment by challenging the
Corps' issuance of a CWA section 404 permit." In addition to their
NEPA claims, plaintiffs purported to bring a citizen suit under the CWA
against both the Corps and the EPA, alleging that the Corps' issuance
of the section 404 permit violated the CWA and, further, that the EPA
Administrator failed in her duty to veto the permit." Rejecting these
assertions, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of all the CWA claims," holding that the CWA does not
permit citizen suits challenging the issuance or denial of a section 404
permit."
Analyzing the CWA claims against the Corps, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that section 1365 of the CWA authorizes suits only "against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to

57.
58.

Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1530.

59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id at 1532.
62. 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996). See supra text accompanying notes 15-35 for the
discussion of the NEPA issues involved in that case.
63. 87 F.3d at 1245.
64. Id.
65. 915 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
66. 87 F.3d at 1249.
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perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator. 7 Further, it explained that the federal
government must normally consent before it can be sued.' In that the
statute only identifies the Administrator, the "Clean Water Act does not
clearly and ambiguously [sic] waive sovereign immunity" for the
Corps. 9 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Corps is simply
not subject to a citizen suit under the CWA.70
The issue of whether the Corps is subject to a citizen suit has been
dealt with by courts in two other circuits. In National Wildlife
Federation v. Hanson,7 the Fourth Circuit held that the Corps could
be sued in a citizen suit because its duty is nondiscretionary,72 while
the District Court for the Western District of Washington recently
rejected such a suit" in Cascade Conservation League v. MA. Segale,
Inc.74 The Eleventh Circuit's holding raises the question of how
citizens can properly challenge the Corps' issuance of a section 404
permit. Although the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue, the
court in Cascade ConservationLeague suggested that the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA")76 and federal question jurisdiction7" provide
adequate avenues for citizens to sue the Corps."
As for the EPA, the Eleventh Circuit noted that citizen suits under the
CWA are available only to compel the Administrator to perform
nondiscretionary duties.78 With regard to the EPA's oversight of the
Corps' section 404 program, the statute merely provides that "the
Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification" of a site for
disposal purposes when the Corps has approved the site.79 Citing the
emphasized language, the court held that the citizen suit provision of the
CWA does not allow citizens to sue the Administrator for failure to
disapprove the Corps' decision to issue a section 404 permit.'s

67. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(aX2) (1994).
68. 87 F.3d at 1249.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
Forest
78.
79.
80.

I4 at 315-16.
921 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
Id. at 696.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
921 F. Supp. at 697 (citing Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States
Serv., 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987)).
87 F.3d at 1249.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
87 F.3d at 1249.
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Plaintiff had argued that the court's decision would effectively nullify
the CWA citizen suit provision in relation to section 404 permits, thereby
making it impossible to challenge the issuance of such a permit."'
Although the court acknowledged this concern, it responded only by
stating that a court's role in interpreting a statute is to "presume that
a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.
The unstated corollary is that if Congress did not
intend this result, the burden is on Congress, not the courts, to remedy
the problem.
Fundfor Animals, Inc. u. Rice also included a citizen suit challenge to
M As discussed in more
the Corps' issuance of a section 404 permit."
detail earlier, that case involved the construction of a landfill in
Sarasota, Florida. At trial, plaintiffs in Fundfor Animals asserted three
violations of the CWA by the Corps: (1) that the Corps acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to choose an alternative site where there
would be less of an adverse impact on the wetlands; (2) that the Corps
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to consider the cumulative
impacts of the decision to issue the section 404 permit; and (3) that the
Corps failed to give notice and hold a public hearing on the permit."
The Eleventh Circuit rejected each of plaintiffs' three CWA arguments
M
and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment."
With regard to the first two arguments, the court again showed its
deference to agency decisions in cases where plaintiffs object to the
agency's value judgments, but fail to show an analytical error or to show
that the agency failed to consider relevant information. On the issue of
the Corps' alternatives analysis, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
In discussing the alternatives analysis, the district court did not
suggest, nor do we, that practicable alternatives may be ignored
because of the mitigation potential of a site, as the Plaintiffs claim. To
the contrary, the district court recognized, as do we, that the Corps had

81. Id. at 1250.
82. Id. (quoting Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)).
83. 85 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1996). This case is also discussed in the NEPA and ESA
sections of this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 36-46 for the NEPA discussion,
and infra text accompanying notes 217-20 for the ESA discussion. Interestingly, although
the CWA basis for this suit was the same as that found in Preserve EndangeredAreas, the
court never addressed whether the CWA citizen suit provision could be used to challenge
the issuance of a section 404 permit. According to counsel for plaintiffs, the Corps simply
never raised it as a defense. Therefore, while Funds for Animals is technically a citizen
suit case, it is probably better understood as a case challenging the Corps' actions under
the Administrative Procedure Act.
84. 85 F.3d at 542.
85. See id at 542-45.
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taken into account all the considerations which factor into the alternaSarasota County, the Corps, the F.W.S., and the
tives analysis ....
E.P.A. all scrutinized the project for over five years, and all agree that
the Walton Tract is the most suitable site for the new landfill.
Accordingly, insofar as the CWA practicable alternatives analysis is
concerned, we hold that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting a permit to fill
seventy-four acres of wetlands on the Walton Tract."
Likewise, on the issue of cumulative impacts, the court disagreed with
plaintiffs' assertion that the Corps had failed to take into account the
impact of the landfill on the Florida panther.8 7 Rather, the court found
that the Corps had considered the cumulative impacts and even
proposed steps to offset the impacts.' The fact that plaintiffs merely
disagreed with the Corps' decisions did not make them arbitrary and
capricious. 89
With regard to plaintiffs' third argument that the Corps failed to hold
a public hearing on the permit, the court noted that the CWA does
require the "opportunity for public hearings.' ° However, the court held:
[t]he statute does not state that the Corps itself must hold its own
public hearings regardless of how many other hearings have been held
on a project. The applicable regulations provide the Corps discretion
to hold hearings on permit applications on an "as needed" basis. If the
Corps determines that it has the information necessary to reach a
decision and that there is "no valid interest to be served by a hearing,"
the Corps has the discretion not to hold one.91
The court found that, because the state had already held two public
hearings on the project, the Corps was not required to hold an additional
hearing.'
Finally, at least one district court decision merits discussion under this
citizen suit section. Sierra Club v. Hankinson93 involved a citizen suit
brought against the EPA as a result of the State of Georgia's failure to
issue Total Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDLs") for its rivers, as required
under the CWA. 4 To understand the court's decision, a brief review of

86. Id. at 544.
87. Id. at 545.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
85 F.3d at 545 (citations omitted).
Id.
939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
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the statutory requirement is helpful. TMDLs are part of the Water
Quality Standards Program under which states are required to adopt
water quality standards for individual bodies of water in the state based
on the uses of the given body of water and the amount of pollution that
would impair those uses." If the effluent limitations imposed under
the NPDES program do not permit a water body to reach the water
quality standard applicable to it, then the state is required to establish
and enforce TMDLs for each pollutant that is preventing that body of
water from attaining its water quality standard." The TMDL is the
total amount of any given pollutant, from both point and nonpoint
sources, that can enter the water each day, with allowances made for
seasonal variation and a margin of safety.9
Further, the CWA
specifically requires the EPA to develop water quality standards and
TMDLs if a state fails to do so or if the EPA disapproves of the lists
produced by the states."
Under the CWA, 1979 was the first deadline for submission by states
of the list of bodies of water that did not meet water quality standards
("water quality limited segments" or "WQLSs") and the accompanying
TMDLs." Georgia submitted its first list of WQLSs in 1992 and its
first TMDLs in 1994.1°0 As of the date of the district court's hearing
on cross-motions for summary judgment, Georgia had submitted, and the
EPA had approved, only two TMDLs for the state's list of WQLSs.10'
Among other arguments, plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Hankinson
asserted that the EPA had a duty to develop TMDLs for Georgia because
the state had failed to do so.' On the issue of TMDLs, the court held:
Georgia clearly has not complied with the TMDL requirements of the
Clean Water Act. The CWA requires states to submit TMDLs for all
WQLSs. In over sixteen years since Georgia's first TMDL submissions
were due, Georgia has developed only two TMDLs, both submitted
after the filing of this action .... Defendants state that Georgia has
promised to develop approximately 25 complex TMDLs for its major
river basins within the next eight years. At this pace, Georgia will
take over a hundred years to complete TMDLs for the approximately
340 WQLSs identified on the 1994 WQLS list.

95. Id. § 1313(a).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 1313(d)(1).
Id. § 1313(dX1XC).
Id. § 1313(d)(2).
939 F. Supp. at 868.
Id,
I&
Id
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The tight deadlines for submission of TMDLs demonstrate a congressional intent that TMDLs be established promptly.... Georgia's submissions clearly fail CWA's requirement that states promptly identify
TMDLs for all WQLSs.
The statutory framework of the CWA granted EPA an oversight
function to ensure that states fulfill their statutory duties. While the
Court acknowledges that the Clean Water Act places "primary reliance
for developing water quality standards on the states," the Court
believes that the Act requires EPA to step in when states fail to fulfill
their duties under the Act. The Court finds that EPA's failure to
disapprove of Georgia's inadequate TMDL submissions was arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and
that EPA's failure to promulgate TMDLs for Georgia violates the Clean

Water Act. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs on their TMDL claim.

°3

The Hankinson decision could have tremendous implications. At least
theoretically, every NPDES permit authorizing discharges into a WQLS
that has constituents above the TMDL is subject to modification. Thus,
the issue of TMDLs will almost certainly be the subject of future editions
of this survey."4
2. Statute of Limitations Under Section 404. One other district
court decision under the CWA warrants some discussion. In United
States v. Reaves,' defendant raised the statute of limitations as a
defense in a suit brought by the government for civil penalties and
injunctive relief arising out of the alleged filling of wetlands without a
section 404 permit in violation of the CWA and the Rivers and Harbors

103. Id at 871-72 (footnotes and citations omitted).
104. Shortly after the issuance of this decision, the court entered an order establishing
the basic parameters of a short and long term TMDL process for Georgia. Sierra Club v.
Hankinson, No. 1:94-CV-2501 MHS (N.D. Ga. September 30,1996). Under the Order, EPA
must promulgate (or ensure that the State promulgates) TMDLs for all WQLSs according
to a basin-by-basin schedule coordinated with Georgia's River Basin Management Plan.
TMDLs must be established for the Chattahoochee and Flint River basins by June 30, 1997
and for the state's other four major river systems by June 30, 2001 at a rate of one per
year. If EPA elects not to follow Georgia's current River Basin Management Plan, TMDLs
must be submitted at a rate of 20% per year for five years. Within one year after
promulgation of the TMDL, EPA or the state must modify, revoke and reissue, or
terminate NPDES permits as necessary to implement the TMDL. On December 31 of each
year, EPA must submit a report to the court detailing its progress in promulgating and
implementing TMDLs for Georgia's WQLSs. An appeal of the court's decision in this case
is pending before the Eleventh Circuit, but the Order continues to be in effect.
105. 923 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
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Act."0 ' The Corps discovered the violation in 1989 and did not file suit
against the owner until 1994, thirteen years after the initial discharge.
In the absence of an express statute of limitations for government
actions in the CWA itself, the parties agreed that 28 U.S.C. § 2462
applied to government actions for civil penalties."' That section
provides a five-year statute of limitations that begins when the claim
first "accrued.""08 Defendant asserted the claim accrued when the
violation first occurred, that is, when he discharged the fill material into
the creek in 1981. However, the government argued that defendant's
violation of the CWA was a continuing violation so long as the fill
material remained in place without a permit. Accordingly, each new day
commenced a new limitations period.
The court agreed with the
government, adopting the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Sasser v.
Administrator,°" and holding that the "unpermitted discharge of
dredged or fill materials into wetlands on the site is a continuing
violation for as long as the fill remains.""0 As a result, the court held
the statute of limitations did not bar the government's claim."'
C. Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and
LiabilityAct
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Redwing Carriers,Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments"2 added significantly to the court's CERCLA jurisprudence. That opinion addresses a variety of issues, including the scope
of persons liable under the statute, the availability of joint and several
liability between responsible parties, and the availability of the third
party defense. In addition, by negative implication, the case rebuked a
recent district court decision questioning the retroactive application of
the statute."8

106. 33 U.S.C.A. § 401-67n (West 1996).
107. 923 F. Supp. at 1533.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).

109. 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993). Accord United States v. Windward Properties, 821
F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990);
North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.C. April 25, 1989).
But see United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995) (discharge of fill
material into wetlands is not a continuing violation while the material remains but, rather,

the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of discharge).
110. 923 F. Supp. at 1534.

111. Id.
112. 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).

113. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d
1506 (11th Cir. 1997), in which Judge Hand held that, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), CERCLA should not be
presumed to have retroactive effect and in the absence of clear expression of congressional
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Redwing Carriersinvolved a lawsuit to recover costs associated with
cleaning up a former trucking facility that had been redeveloped into an
apartment complex.114 Redwing Carriers, Inc. ("Redwing") had used
the property as a trucking terminal from 1961 to 1972.15 During that
period, the terminal serviced trucks carrying construction and other
materials that included asphalt, tar, and sulfur. Trucks were cleaned
out on site, with wastewater running directly onto the ground." In
addition, Redwing also dumped excess asphalt and other materials into
pits dug on site.117 In 1971, Redwing sold the property to a series of
intervening landowners who, in turn, sold the property in 1973 to
Saraland then hired
Saraland Apartments, Ltd. ("Saraland")."
Meador Contracting Company ("Meador") to build an apartment complex
on the site."9 As part of the construction project, Meador had to
grade, excavate, and fill the ground on the property, during which time
its subcontractors encountered "patches of contaminated soil and
deposits of ... tar-like substances buried by Redwing."'20 In 1980,
Saraland hired Marcrum Management Company ("Marcrum") as its
"management agent" for the property. 2 ' In 1984, a group of investors
(the "Partnership") bought-out the original partners in Saraland.m

intent to create retroactive liability, CERCLA should only be given prospective effect. 927
F. Supp. at 1519-20. The context in which this question arose was a proposed consent
order between EPA and Olin for the cleanup of Olin's property which had become
contaminated before the enactment of CERCLA. The court declined to approve the consent
order and dismissed the case against Olin, finding that the foundations on which other
courts had held CERCLA to have a retroactive effect were eviscerated by the decision in
Landgraf. I&
Immediately prior to publication of this article, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision in Olin, expressly holding that CERCLA should be given retroactive effect.
United States v. Olin Corp, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). This decision supports the
Eleventh Circuit's implicit holding of retroactive liability found in several cases, including
Redwing Carriers,Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514 (11th
Cir. 1996), and South Florida Water Management District v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402 (11th
Cir. 1996), all of which are discussed in this survey. In each of these cases, the acts which
gave rise to the contamination occurred before CERCLA was enacted. In Olin, the
Eleventh Circuit specifically states that the district court's ruling on retroactive liability
"runs contrary to all other decisions on point." 107 F.3d at 1511.
114. 94 F.3d at 1494.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. IA
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1495.
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Specifically, a group referred to as the "Hutton Partners" purchased a
ninety-nine percent limited partnership interest, while Robert Coit and
Roar Company purchased a one percent general partnership interest.
Under the partnership agreement, Coit and Roar were primarily
responsible for managing the business of the partnership."
Saraland first became aware of tar seeping onto the surface of the
property in 1977.124 By the mid-1980s, the EPA was involved with the
site, entering into an administrative order with Redwing in 198 5 .1"
By the time of the lawsuit, Redwing claimed to have spent approximately $1.9 million in investigation and clean-up costs at the site.se
Due to the range of topics covered by the decision, the following
discussion divides the decision by its major issues. When other cases
during the survey period address the same issues, those decisions will
be discussed in those subsections alongside Redwing Carriers.
1. Persons Liable. By its statutory scheme, CERCLA makes four
different classes of persons potentially liable for response costs. 127 The
Redwing Carriers decision addresses three of these four categories.
Specifically, Redwing filed suit against the Partnership and its general
and limited partners as current owners and operators of the site and as
persons who arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances." 2
Redwing also filed against Meador as a person who arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances and against Marcrum as both a current
operator and as an operator at the time of disposal.' 9 The district
court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of all

123. Id.
124. Id. at 1494.
125. Id. at 1495.
126. Id.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). These potentially liable parties are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance ....

ld.
128. 94 F.3d at 1497.
129. Id.
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the defendants except the Partnership, which conceded it was a liable
party as the current owner of the site."a However, the district court
allocated one-hundred percent of the response costs to Redwing, thereby
absolving the Partnership of any liability under CERCLA." Redwing
then appealed both the district court's decision regarding the liability of
the other defendants and its decision on the allocation of costs.' 2
a. Current Owners and Operators. As a threshold matter, in
granting summary judgment in favor of the partners, the district court
read literally the phrase "owner and operator" in section 107(a)(1) as
being a requirement that the liable party be both owner and operator of
the site." However, citing to its earlier decision in United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp.,' 4 the Eleventh Circuit noted that earlier panels
of the court had already "interpreted the phrase 'owner and operator' in
subsection 107(a)(1) to be disjunctive, imposing liability on any person
who was either the current owner or the current operator of a facility."'3 The Eleventh Circuit went on to state that, despite the language of the statute, "[tihe district court was not free to disregard Fleet
Factors [sic] reasoning, and neither are we."' 8 Accordingly, it is
"settled that a person is a responsible party under subsection 107(a)(1)
if they are the current owner or operator of a facility."3 7
With that preliminary point settled, the court began its discussion of
whether the limited partners were liable as owners of the site. 3 In
analyzing the issue, the Eleventh Circuit looked to state partnership law
Finding
for guidance on the definition of owners of real property.'
that Alabama law did not make limited partners owners of the
partnership property, the court held the limited partners were not
owners within the meaning of CERCLA.'"
After deciding that the limited partners were not current owners of
the property, the court next considered whether they might be "opera-

130. Id. at 1495.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. 875 F. Supp. 1545, 1555-56 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
134. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
135. 94 F.3d at 1498.
136. I&
137. Id.
138. The court did not examine whether the general partners were owners, operators,
or arrangers, because it assumed they were covered persons under the Act. Id. at 1507.
See infra discussion at note 146.
139. 94 F.3d at 1498.
140. I&
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tors" of the site."" Plaintiff argued that, under the Fourth Circuit's
"authority to control" test, the limited partners should be liable as
operators because, under the partnership agreement, they had the right
to control certain partnership activities.'
However, the court said
that "the Fourth Circuit's 'authority to control' test is simply incompatible with our reasoning in JacksonvilleElec[tric... in which] we adopted
the 'actual control' standard for operator liability.""
The "actual
control" test is a bifurcated standard under which a plaintiff must show
the defendant "either (1) actually participated in operating the Site or
in the activities resulting in the disposal of hazardous substances, or (2)
'actually exercised control over, or [were] otherwise intimately involved
in the operations of' the Partnership."1 " Under this test, the court
held that the limited partners were not liable as "operators."'
The court then turned to the question of liability for the general
partners who raised the so-called third-party defense under section
107(b)."
For purposes of its analysis, the court assumed that the
general partners were within the class of responsible parties under
section 107(a). ' 7 Under the third party defense, a party is not liable
if it can show that
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by....
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration

the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences

that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions..

.'

Looking at Coit's and Roar's actions regarding the tar seeps, the court
found that

141. Id. at 1502-03.

142. Id. at 1504.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1505.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1507.
Id.

148. Id. at 1507-08 (citation omitted).
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Coit and Roar have satisfied all the elements of this defense. The
general partners have never had a direct or indirect contractual
relationship with either Redwing or Meador Contracting Company the only two parties whose conduct potentially caused the release or
threat of hazardous substances at the Saraland site ....
The record indicates that since 1984, the general partners have
exercised due care towards the hazardous substances contaminating
the property
.... Coit and Roar have demonstrated they did nothing to exacerbate
conditions at the Site.1'49
Based on this finding, the court held, "Coit and Roar have carried
their burden of demonstrating they are entitled to summary judgment
on their third-party defense under [section] 107(b). This defense relieves
the general partners of any direct liability under CERCLA. " 1W
Redwing also asserted that Marcrum, the current apartment
management company, was liable as a current operator under section
107(a)(1).' 5 ' Marcrum defended by claiming that it only provided
administrative assistance in running the complex that, it argued, should
not be sufficient to create operator liability under CERCLA. Due to the
fact-sensitive nature of operator liability under CERCLA, it is important
to review the list of duties Marcrum executed as managing agent for the
complex. In performing these duties, Marcrum:
1. prepared annual budgets for the complex and required the resident
manager to regularly report expenses to Marcrum and seek approval
from Marcrum of any expenses exceeding the budget;
2. regularly inspected the complex, and required the resident manager
to perform quarterly inspections and report on these inspections to
Marcrum;
3. ordered the resident manager to implement major improvement and
repair programs for the complex as a whole;
4. ordered the resident manager to make specific repairs to particular
units by certain deadlines;
5. received complaints from tenants, and forwarded these complaints
to the resident manager with instructions as to how and by when to
respond to the complaints; and
6. prepared proposed rent increases for approval by the Partnership
and HUD.
In addition to having a hand in these routine operations of the
complex, the record also suggests Marcrum has, in the past, been

149. Id at 1508.
150. Id.
151. Id at 1509.
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partly responsible
for remedying tar seeps as they appeared on the
152
property.

Reviewing these factors, the court held that
[t]aken as a whole, this evidence could support a claim that Marcrum
is an operator of the Saraland site. Unlike the case against Tuft

University and Jacksonville Elec[tric], it is evident that Marcrum is
"actively involved in... [the] occupational business affairs" of Saraland

Apartments. This supports the finding that Marcrum has "actually
participated in the operations of the facility" so as to be an "operator"
within the meaning of section 107(a). We therefore reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment on Redwing's claim under
subsection 107(a)(1) based on Marcrum being a current operator of the
site.'58

In light of the court's holding that the general partners could avail
themselves of the third-party defense under section 107(b), one could
speculate that Marcrum might also ultimately escape liability on similar
grounds. However, more significant perhaps is the extent to which the
court's decision may impact other property managers who might not be
able to satisfy the "due care" requirement of the third-party defense.
b. Owners and Operators at the 71me of Disposal. Redwing also
asserted that Marcrum was liable as a past operator under subsection
107(a)(2).'
In order to determine whether Marcrum was an operator
of the facility during a time hazardous substances were disposed of at
the site, the court had to more clearly define "disposal."15 ' Redwing
asserted that, even though all the hazardous substances at the facility
first came to be located on the property prior to Marcrum's tenure, the
paving of a parking lot and the underground utility repair work
performed under Marcrum's management caused the materials to be
spread or dispersed about the site, and thus constituted "disposal.""
The court agreed with Redwing with regard to this "secondary disposal
argument," stating that "we do not read CERCLAs definition of
'disposal' as being limited to instances where a hazardous substance is
initially introduced into the environment at a facility." 117 Instead, the
court held that "CERCLA's definition of 'disposal' should be read broadly
to include the subsequent movement and dispersal of hazardous

152. Id. at 1509-10.

153. Id. at 1510 (citation omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Id.
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substances within a facility.""5 However, the court found no evidence
that the paving or gas line work disturbed or moved any contaminated
soil.1 9 Therefore, the court upheld the district court's issuance of
summary judgment on Marcrum's status as an operator at the time of
disposal, implicitly rejecting the possibility that mere passive migration
could constitute disposal.' °
c. Persons who Arrange for Disposal of Hazardous Substances. A
second Eleventh Circuit decision, South Florida Water Management
District v. Montalvo,"' was cited by the court in Redwing Carriersas
setting forth the standard for determining "arranger" liability."
In
that case, the owner of a pesticide manufacturing and spraying service
sought contribution for costs incurred in cleaning up its contaminated
chemical loading site from various farmers (referred to in the opinion as
"Landowners") who contracted for the company's aerial-spray pesticide
services." The third-party plaintiffs alleged that, by virtue of their
contracts with the Landowners, the Landowners had "arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances."'
The district court dismissed the
complaint against the Landowners, and third-party plaintiffs appealed."'
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that CERCLA does
not define the phrase "arranged for," so courts have looked at various
factors to define the parameters of the phrase.'" Citing its decision
in Florida Power & Light v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,67 the court noted
that in the Eleventh Circuit there is no bright-line test for determining
whether someone arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances.'
Rather, the trier of fact must make a fact-specific determination in every
case.
However, the court identified as particularly important a
party's intent and knowledge (or lack thereof) of the disposal of the
hazardous substances. 70
158. Id
159. Id
160. Id. at 1511.
161. 84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996).
162. 94 F.3d at 1506.
163. 84 F.3d at 405.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 404.
166. Id. at 406-07.
167. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990), discussed in Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott
Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1411 (1991).
168. 84 F.3d at 406.
169. Id. at 407.
170. Id.
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The court in Montalvo disagreed with third-party plaintiffs' assertion
that arranger liability can be based solely on the fact that the Landowners contracted for their spraying services and held that third-party
plaintiffs must be able to show that the Landowners did "more than
simply [contract] for aerial spraying services."'71 Third-party plaintiffs
in Montalvo could not show that the Landowners assisted them in
loading the planes or rinsing the tanks or that there was evidence that
the Landowners even knew the spills of pesticides had occurred."'
The court wrote, "[Tihe Landowners contracted to have pesticides
applied to their property. They did not agree to have pesticides and
contaminated rinse water spilled onto the [contaminated] Site." 7s
There was also no allegation that the Landowners had any control or
authority over third-party plaintiffs' actions.7 4 While the Landowners
bought, and therefore owned, the chemicals that were sprayed on their
property, the court stated that "the Landowners' owne[rship of] the
pesticides during the application process does not, by itself, imply the
kind of control over the Sprayers' application procedures" necessary to
find arranger liability.175
Although the court rejected third-party plaintiffs' arguments and
affirmed the dismissal of their claims, the court also declined "the
Landowners' invitation to broadly exclude from CERCLA's reach cases
where a plaintiff seeks to hold a defendant liable because the defendant
contracted for a service involving the use and disposal of hazardous
substances."176 The court noted that each decision requires a factbased determination, and there could be circumstances when a
contracting party asserts the kind of control over the use and disposal
of the hazardous substances necessary to create arranger liability. 77
Third-party plaintiffs in Montalvo, however, simply failed to prove such
circumstances were present in that case.
As mentioned above, the panel in Redwing Carrierscited Montalvo in
addressing Redwing's claim that the limited partners and Meador, the
construction company, arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances

171. Id. Likewise, in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514
(11th Cir. 1996), the court held that the "mere sale of a useful product without additional
evidence that the transaction included an arrangement for the disposal of the hazardous
substance does not subject the manufacturers [of the product] to liability under CERCLA."
Id. at 1517 (affirming following appeal after remand).
172. 84 F.3d at 407.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 408.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 409.
177. Id.
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on the property.17 Regarding the limited partners, the three events
that Redwing cited as constituting arranging for disposal were (1) the
repaving of the parking lot in 1986, (2) the repairing of the gas line in
1991, during which soil was disturbed, and (3) the failing of the
partnership to remove the tar seeps as provided under an agreement
reached in 1984.17
The Redwing panel dismissed the third basis first, stating that failure
to remove the tar could not constitute arranging for the disposal of the
tar at the site because, by failing to remove the tar, the limited partners
just left it in the ground.18° Failure to act was not an "affirmative act"
to arrange for disposal of the tar, as required by Montalvo. ' As for
the repaving and the gas line work, the court found Redwing had failed
to show a connection between the limited partners and these actions.'
Therefore, they could not be held liable as arrangers based on those
events.1
With regard to Meador's liability, in keeping with its earlier finding
that disposal includes the subsequent dispersal of hazardous substances,
the court held that "'disposal' may occur when a party disperses
contaminated soil during the course of grading and filling a construction
site."' 4 In so holding, the court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Meador.'c Meador then argued that
even if it disposed of hazardous materials during the construction, it did
not intend to do so. However, the court held that intent is irrelevant in
proving a party arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances.""'
2. Claims Under Section 107 versus Claims Under Section
113. The decision in Redwing Carrieralso addressed whether a party
who is a "covered person" under section 107 of CERCLA can bring an

178.

94 F.3d at 1505-06, 1511.

179. Id. at 1506.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1512.
185. Id.
186. Id. At first blush, this holding appears inconsistent with the court's statement in
Montalvo that a party's intent is especially important. See supra text accompanying note
167. The inconsistency is probably best reconciled by understanding the intent
requirement as focusing on the act giving rise to disposal, rather than the actual disposal.
Thus, the landowners in Montalvo were not liable because they had no knowledge of or
intent regarding the acts giving rise to disposal. In contrast, Meador was liable in Redwing
because, although it did not specifically intend to dispose of hazardous substances, it did
intend to do the regrading activities that resulted in the disposal.
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action under that section, or alternatively, whether such parties are
limited to contribution actions under section 113. This issue is
significant because section 107 claims are subject to joint and several
liability, 8 7 whereas under section 113, a claimant may only recover an
equitable share from a fellow potentially responsible party.'
Although Redwing brought its claims under both provisions, the court held
that
[als a matter of law, ...

Redwing's CERCLA claims against the
Appellees are claims for contribution governed by [section] 113(f). 7b
bring a cost recovery action based solely on (section] 107(a), Redwing
would have to be an innocent party to the contamination of the
Saraland Site .... Redwing cannot deny it originally disposed of most,
if not all, of the hazardous substances now contaminating the Site.
Redwing is a responsible party under CERCLA, and therefore, its
claims against other allegedly responsible parties are claims for
contribution.'"
D.

Resource Conservationand Recovery Act
In PaineWebberIncome PropertiesThree Ltd. Partnershipv. Mobil Oil
Corp.,' the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida wrestled with the question of whether petroleum that leaked
from an underground storage tank ("UST") is a "hazardous waste" under
RCRA. The issue arose under RCRAs citizen suit provision that allows
private parties to seek an injunction against any person "who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an eminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment."' 9' Under this "eminent endangerment"
provision, a plaintiff is required to give notice to the EPA, the state, and
the potential defendant, ninety days before filing suit, unless the claim

187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1996).
188. Id. § 9613(f). The four other Circuit courts to address this issue concur with the
Eleventh Circuit's position. See United States v. Colorado & E.R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th
Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1stCir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th
Cir. 1994); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989). But see Pneumo
Abex Corp. v. Bessemer Lake Erie R.R., 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Va. 1996); Idylwoods Assoc.
v. Mader Capital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Burlington N.R.R. v. Time Oil
Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
189. 94 F.3d at 1496 (emphasis added).
190. 902 F. Supp. 1514 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(aX1)(B) (1994).
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arises under RCRA's provisions governing hazardous wastes.192 If the
suit concerns a hazardous waste, the action may be brought immediately
after notice is given. 9 ' In Painewebber,the plaintiff failed to give the
ninety-day notice, but argued that its claim should not be dismissed,
alleging that the leaked petroleum was a hazardous waste under
RCRA.' "
Thus, the question before the court was whether petroleum products
released from a UST are hazardous waste. The court noted that one
95
district court in Georgia had termed petroleum a hazardous waste,
but it found more persuasive decisions from other district courts that
held that petroleum can be a solid waste but not a hazardous waste.'
The court specifically agreed with the holding by the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois in Winston v. Shell Oil
Co., which found petroleum is not a hazardous waste."9 In reaching
its conclusion, the court in Winston first noted that Congress did not
specifically exclude petroleum from the definition of hazardous waste,
even though it had excluded petroleum from the definition of hazardous
However, under RCRA, petroleum is
substance in CERCLA.'9 s
classified in subchapter IX as a "regulated substance," which is defined
as "(A) any substance defined in section 9601(14) of this title (but not
including any substance regulated as a hazardous waste under
subchapter III of this chapter), and (B) petroleum."' 9 The court in
Winston reasoned that, by including petroleum in this definition of
regulated substances and excluding substances classified as hazardous
wastes, Congress evidenced its intent to exclude petroleum from the
definition of hazardous waste.' °
Adopting the reasoning in Winston, the court in Painewebberheld that
petroleum that had leaked from a UST is not a hazardous waste. 20'
Also, finding that the notice "requirements 'are mandatory conditions
precedent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit provisions,'"

192. Id. § 6972(bX2XA).
193. Id.
194. 902 F. Supp. at 1518.
195. See Recycling, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 856 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
196. 902 F. Supp. at 1519. See also Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., No.
93C4210 1993 WL 524808 (N.D. I1. Dec. 15, 1993); Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254
(S.D. Cal. 1991).
197. 861 F. Supp. 713, 716 (C.D. 111. 1994), ouerruedby Waldschmidt v. Amoco Oil Co.,
924 F. Supp. 88, 92 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
198. 902 F. Supp. at 1519.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2) (1996).
200. 200 F. Supp. at 1519.
201. Id.
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the court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment °"
because plaintiff had failed to meet the ninety-day notice requirement.o
E. Endangered Species Act
1. Statutory Framework. The ESA seeks to protect endangered
and threatened species through limiting or prohibiting a wide range of
In parts
activities harmful to those species and their ecosystems.'
relevant to the cases discussed below, section 7 of the ESA requires
federal agencies to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined ... to be critical.' 2 ° ' Thus, if it appears an agency action
is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of its habitat, the agency must consult with the Secretary of the Interior
or the Secretary of Commerce (collectively, the "Secretary") before
commencing that action. 2°
As part of that consultation, the FWS undertakes a study of the
project and issues a biological opinion.' ° The biological opinion states
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
A "jeopardy" opinion means
modification of a critical habitat.2"
adverse consequences are likely, while a "no jeopardy" opinion means
adverse consequences are not expected.co
The Secretary creates and maintains the lists, of endangered and
threatened species pursuant to section 4 of the ESA. 210 An endangered
species is defined as one "which is in danger of extinction throughout all

202. Id. at 1522. On a motion for rehearing, the court clarified that its decision related
to the question of jurisdiction and not the merits of plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, plaintiff
was not barred from curing the notice defect and refiling or pursuing its pendant state law
claims in state court. See idL
203. I& at 1519.
204. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
205. Id. § 1536(aX2).
206. Id. § 1536(aX3).
207. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4) (1996).
208. Id. § 402.14(hX3).
209. Id.
210. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994).
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or a- significant portion of its range."" A threatened species is one
"which is likely to become an endangered species witlin the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range."2 2 The
Secretary also designates the habitats of endangered and threatened
species as "critical," which heightens the protection these habitats are
accorded from federal actions that are likely to jeopardize the existence
of the species in question. 13 In addition, section 4 requires the
Secretary to develop and implement "recovery plans" that formulate
actions designed to enhance species recovery to the point where ESA
protection is no longer needed.214
Finally, section 9 of the ESA prohibits anyone from importing or
exporting, taking, possessing, delivering, carrying, transporting or
shipping, or selling or offering to sell endangered or threatened
species. 216 The term "take" is defined by the statute as "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct."
2. Recovery Plans under Section 4. In addition to their NEPA
and CWA claims, plaintiffs in Fund for Animals, Inc. u. Rice217 also
asserted ESA claims alleging that the Corps and the FWS unlawfully
violated a 1987 Recovery Plan for the Florida panther. The court
summarized plaintiffs' arguments as follows:
(1) the ESA requires that recovery plans shall be developed and
implemented for endangered species; (2) the F.W.S.'s 1987 Recovery
Plan for the Florida Panther includes a "Habitat Preservation Plan"
stating that "areas proposed for habitat preservation," which include
the Walton Tract, "should be monitored to the maximum extent
possible to obviate adverse habitat modifications;" (3) the F.W.S. fails
to "implement" the Recovery Plan if it issues a "no jeopardy" opinion
for a suitable Florida Panther habitat as specified by the Recovery

Plan; and (4) the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on
"no jeopardy" opinions in granting a permit to Sarasota
the F.W.S.
2 18
County.

211. Id. § 1532(6). Insects are expressly excluded from this definition. See id.
212. Id. § 1532(20).
213. Id. § 1533(aX3).
214. Id. § 1533(f).
215. Id. § 1538(a). The-Secretary can also issue exemptions from this provision. Id.
§ 1539(a).
216. Id. § 1532(19).
217. 85 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1996). See supra text accompanying notes 37-40 for a
discussion of the facts of the case.
218. 85 F.3d at 547.
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Explaining that the 1987 Recovery Plan "is not a document with the
force of law," the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the government defendants.2 1 The
court stated:
The Plaintiffs' line of reasoning is flawed in several respects. First, the
practical effect of the Plaintiffs' position would be to elevate the 1987

Recovery Plan into a document with the force of law. We cannot take
such an approach. Section 1533(f) makes it plain that recovery plans

are for guidance purposes only. By providing general guidance as to
what is required in a recovery plan, the ESA "breathe[s] discretion at
every pore."
Second, the Plaintiffs' position cannot be reconciled with the Corps'
statutory duty under [section] 7 of the ESA to consult with the F.W.S.

about the environmental impact of proposed agency actions and the
F.W.S.'s duty to arrive at a biological opinion based upon the best
scientific data available. There would be absolutely no point to the
consultation and preparation of a biological opinion if the F.W.S.'s

opinion were predetermined based upon whether proposed project lands
fell within the borders of properties discussed in one of any number of
recovery plan documents ....
Third, the F.W.S. identified reasonable justifications for issuing its
"no jeopardy" Biological Opinions. To begin with, there have been no
verified Florida Panther sightings either on the Walton Tract or near
it within the last ten years. According to the Florida Panther Habitat
Protection Plan ("HPP"), there is no occupied Florida Panther territory
anywhere in Sarasota County ....

Moreover, the contested land has

not been designated as critical habitat under the ESA. It is a major
flaw in the Plaintiffs' argument to assume that the project will destroy
or adversely modify the Florida Panther's "critical habitat" when it has
not been determined that this particular site is a critical habitat. The
land included in the HPP's recommendation for a critical habitat
designation area is not anywhere in Sarasota County. In addition, the
Walton Tract has not been identified as a reintroduction site for
Florida Panthers, nor is it adjacent to any such sites.2w

3.
Unlawful "Takings" by Individuals. United States v.
Guthrie221 involved an appeal following a conditional guilty plea to
charges of taking, possessing, selling, and transporting an endangered
species in violation of section 9 of the ESA 2m Guthrie had been

219. Id. at 548.
220. Id. at 547-48 (citations omitted).
221. 50 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995).
222. Id. at 937. Guthrie was also charged with violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371-73, by purchasing and selling alligator snapping turtles which are protected by
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arrested by undercover agents from whom he bought several Alabama
red-bellied turtles, animals that the Secretary had added to the
Guthrie's primary argument on
endangered species list in 1 9 8 7 .'
appeal regarding the Alabama red-bellied turtle was that it was actually
than a species, and was therefore not eligible for ESA
a hybrid, rather
22 4
protection.

Guthrie's argument hinged on DNA analysis which he alleged would
conclusively show that the Alabama red-bellied turtle was actually a
hybrid. During its review, the Secretary had noted that "[tihe taxonomic
status of this turtle has been questioned," but, based on all the evidence,
the Secretary determined the animal merited status as a species. 225
Significantly, the DNA evidence promoted by Guthrie was not available
at the time of the turtle's listing, and Guthrie never attempted to
present DNA evidence to the agency in a challenge of that listing.'
Consequently, the court held that Guthrie's collateral attack on the
Alabama red-bellied turtle's listing must fail. 7 In so doing, the court
emphasized that the ESA provides mechanisms for individuals to
challenge the listing of a species as endangered or threatened,' but
that
Guthrie did not seek to change the agency regulation. He chose to
violate the law. We will not reward that choice by allowing him to
bypass the agency and receive judicial review of the regulation in light
of the new DNA study. Instead, Guthrie at most is entitled to the
same review he would have received had he sought direct review of the
agency regulation at the time it was promulgated. Such a review is
limited to the evidence before the agency at [the time of promulgation]."

Alabama state regulations. 50 F.3d at 937. The Lacey Act makes it a federal felony to
deal in any fish or wildlife taken in violation of a state or foriegn law. 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d).
Among the defenses rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, defendant argued that the Lacey Act
resulted in an unconstitutional delegation. 50 F.3d at 938. The court held this argument
was foreclosed by its decision in United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988),
in which the court upheld the Lacey Act's provision enforcing foreign law, finding it
"involved no delegation of power." Id.
223. 50 F.3d at 939. See also 52 Fed. Reg. 22,939 (June 1987).
224. 50 F.3d at 939.
225. I at 945.
226. Id. at 944. There was evidence in the record suggesting that Guthrie may not
have been interested in getting the turtle de-listed. Rather, it appeared he may have
hoped to develop a private stock for which he would be highly compensated once the animal
became extinct in the wild. Id. at 938.
227. Id. at 946.
228. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(bX3)(A), § 1540(g) (1994).
229. 50 F.3d at 944.

